BLUEPRINT FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ

Con George-Kotzabasis

The ideas behind most of these proposals were conceived at the beginning of December 2006, but the paper was not published for obvious reasons as it was sent both to President Bush and Vice-President Cheney, on January 2, 2007. Now, however, that the new US strategy under the command of general Petraeus has been implemented in Iraq, I think the paper can be published without any detriment to the US strategy. As events have shown, the US military is taking hard measures against Iran by arresting some of its citizens in Iraq suspected of supplying weapons and roadside bombs to the insurgents, as well as US commandos crossing the border of Iraq into Iran in search and destroy operations of caches of munitions--of which we don't hear about--that are earmarked to be supplied to the insurgents. Also, some of the "Surge" of US forces have been deployed in the province of al Anbar where many of the insurgents, in anticipation of the Surge have abandoned Baghdad, are now heavily concentrated. And last, but not least, the US has a secret plan to attack Iran within twenty-four hours on the orders of the President.

Background: The Current Situation

A constellation of the “best and the brightest” stars of American foreign policy-makers and diplomats are presently attempting to prevent the “penumbra of defeat” from casting its ominous shadow over Iraq. Ominous, from the standpoint that the Administration’s war against Iraq was and is an essential part of the war against global terror, as the cause of the war was the reasonable alarm and concern of the Bush administration - in the aftermath of 9/11 – that the Saddam regime could potentially be in the immediate future a supplier of weapons of mass destruction to the global terrorists. Hence, a real or seeming defeat of the US forces in Iraq would have portentous ramifications on its war against the global jihadist fanatics and its state sponsors, such as Syria, and to a greater extent, Iran. So the stakes for the US are strategically high, as the outcome of an even apparent defeat by the Americans in Iraq would make the holy warriors of Islam stronger, more brazen and more deadly. In the eyes of these fanatics they will see in this “defeat” and in all of their future and impending actions, the imprimatur of Allah.

A premature withdrawal of American forces from Iraq before the consolidation of its government and the latter’s ability to quell the insurgency by its own military would be an irremediable strategic error. It would surpass by a greater order of magnitude all the other errors committed by the US in the aftermath of the defeat of Saddam Hussein. Moreover, if the rationale for the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was the war against global terror -as President Bush pointed out and as both houses of Congress accepted and voted for overwhelmingly - no responsible and historically astute political leadership would withdraw from this war just because of the difficulties that have arisen, as a result of the past mistakes of the war-makers. War by definition is difficult and is far from being error-free. But no strategist of Napoleonic dimensions abandons the field of battle because of difficulties. The military vocation and responsibility of a good strategist is to promptly overcome these difficulties by a new adroit and unconventional strategy that will address these difficulties, while at the same time plan to deal such a surprising and lethal blow to the enemy, that within a short time will disable him and make him powerless to continue his fighting.

The Baker-Hamilton Commission, formally known as the Iraq Study Group, (ISG) rules out a victory in Iraq. Henry Kissinger also believes that victory is no longer possible. It has been reported, that the ISG will recommend to the President next month to seek political accommodation with the insurgents, and to open a diplomatic avenue of negotiations with Syria and Iran and entice the latter to involve themselves toward a peaceful outcome in Iraq. Such a proposition issuing from such a high-powered group, in the face of statements by American commanders on the ground that both Syria, and especially Iran are providing arms and funds to the insurgency reveals that the ISG has hoisted its cognitive anchor from the moorings of realpolitik. One has to remind the Baker-Hamilton Commission that whomever one seeks to negotiate with, one acknowledges as master of the situation, to paraphrase Karl Marx. To go to the negotiating table, cap in hand, when your implacable enemy perceives himself to be at the threshold of military victory, is to make a parody of realist diplomacy, as well as doing this at the expense of US strategic interests.

However, not to be unjust to the Baker panel, if the latter is prepared to enforce its demands upon Syria and Iran through diplomacy - backed by an explicit threat of a military attack by the US if they don’t comply - then such a move on the chessboard of diplomacy might checkmate the menacing and nefarious role of Syria and Iran in their support of the Iraqi insurgents and Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the event these demands are rejected by Syria and Iran then the US will have no other option but to unleash its mighty arsenal against them with no quarter given. Only by such diplomacy backed by the clear and unrelenting use of one’s military power against one’s inexorable enemies can one subdue the latter and achieve one’s strategically uncompromising demands. Moreover--and this is the ultimate issue that cannot be resolved by any kind of diplomatic discourse—even if an accommodation is reached by this US power-implemented diplomacy with Syria and Iran in regards to Iraq, the “narrative” of the war against global terror will not change. The war of Western democracies, and especially of the US - being the only nation that can comprehensively defeat it - against this infamy of international terror will continue. But a vital modification in this narrative will be that the jihadists will have a weaker base from which they can launch their attacks against the West once they lose the overt and covert support of Syria and Iran, and more generally of other states that covertly and financially support terrorists. So, the positive repercussions emanating from such a military-backed diplomacy by the US will be an enormous strategic fillip for the latter in its war against global terror, and especially against the insurgency in Iraq.

NEW STRATEGY MUST SECURE BAGHDAD

“Flipping the bird”, to use a Brooklyn term, of gradual withdrawal in whatever form before the job is done, as presumably is going to be suggested to the President by the Iraq Study Group - according to leaked reports - is not a step toward victory but a step toward defeat. But for the job to be done either by Americans or Iraqis, or in combination, the strategic and tactical “steps” on the ground against the insurgents will have to change radically. Also, for this new strategy to be successful, it will be necessary to inject a dose of ruthlessness into the coalition forces’ operations that is commensurate to the ruthlessness of the insurgents. The spread of fear by the insurgents must be countermanded by the greater fear of what will happen to them and to their sundry political supporters within Iraq by the might of US military power used against them sans civilized compunctions. The rules of engagement of US troops and the use of the means of war against the insurgents must change seminally in this new strategy. Only by doing so will the latter ensure the defeat of this irreconcilable and bloodthirsty enemy.

Campaign Tactics

Securing Baghdad will be the point d’ appui of this new campaign against the insurgents--with whose military tactics for the achievement of this goal we will deal with further down. Hence, a concentration of US coalition forces will be needed to clear up or eliminate the insurgents from the areas where they are hiding, and restore security under the continuing presence of the coalition forces.

The following tactics are crucial for securing Baghdad:

1. An important element in this new strategy will be degrading the ability of the insurgents to use car bombs, both against civilians, as well as Iraqi security forces. To accomplish this task, the Iraqi government must pass a law that will prescribe that no vehicle within the commercial and servicing areas of Baghdad will be allowed to park without at least one passenger being in it. In case a car has no one in it or is seen to be abandoned by its driver, that will immediately send a warning to commuters close to it that it’s more likely than not a car bomb. To prevent the insurgents from using dummies or kidnapped passengers tied to the vehicle, the latter must have its passenger side-window open so nearby commuters will be able to see whether it is a dummy or a kidnapped person. Hence an important corollary of this law will be the willy-nilly change of Iraqi civilians into commuter vigilantes who will promptly identify a terrorist whom they themselves could arrest when he takes leave of his vehicle, if no security personnel are in the vicinity. This law of course will not prevent the detonation of a car bomb by a suicide bomber who will not abandon his vehicle. But it will diminish in substantial numbers the car bombs by taking out of the equation all those vehicles that are exploded by remote control without suicide bombers in them. Hence, the Iraqi Government, by the passing of this law, not only will diminish the number of car bombs, but it will also actively “mobilise” all civilian commuters against this murderous weapon of the insurgents.

2. Securing Baghdad will require an increased number of US troops, as has already been adumbrated by the Bush administration. The troops will be deployed both within the environs of the city and beyond for the double purpose of clearing areas where the insurgents are hiding and receiving financial support and nourishment from local leaders as well as placing a stranglehold upon them. Bearing also in mind that because the modality of the insurgency is “anarchic” since its operations are not directed by a central command post, as each group of insurgents is doing its own thing - the coalition forces can only decapitate the insurgency by destroying the supply lines and logistics of each group. Hence, only by destroying the caches of munitions of the insurgents will the Americans be able to enervate the insurgency.

3. At the start of the military campaign of cleansing Baghdad of insurgents, the al Maliki government must make the announcement that all entrance and exit points of Baghdad will be closed and no one will be allowed to enter or leave the city. More specifically, unbeknown to the insurgents, Baghdad will be encircled by US troops, so if any of the insurgents embedded within Baghdad attempt to escape the coalition forces’ attack within the capital will be killed by the encircling US troops. (This tactic of encirclement can also apply on a mini-scale, such as Sadr city or any other areas within Baghdad. The commanders on the ground will decide on the scale of its use.) Certainly this closure of the city will cause some inconvenience to the civilians, but this “naval blockade on land” is absolutely necessary for the defeat of the insurgents within Baghdad. This will lock the new American strategy like a vise around them, for if any try to enter or leave the city they will be killed without question. And once Baghdad falls from the hold of the insurgents and the security of the city is accomplished by the continued presence of US troops, Baghdad again will be an open city.

4. However, the consolidation of the security of Baghdad in the long term can only be accomplished if this security is expanded and achieved in other towns that are in the vicinity of Baghdad. Therefore the towns that are situated in the province of al Anbar, and which are Sunni strongholds of the Iraqi insurgency, will also have to be cleared from the menace of the insurgents. To be successful in this task US strategists will have to pick an appropriate town from this province and resort to unique strategic tactics in the form of “a prototype of destruction” that will serve as a deadly example to the insurgents and to their clan and Sheikh leaders of what awaits them in other towns of Iraq, if they do not surrender. US forces will blockade the town and announce to its residents that if they want to save themselves from a devastating attack they will have to take immediate leave of their town. Once civilians exit their town --and quite possibly some insurgents will be amongst them but they will be unarmed, otherwise they will not be able to pass through the American checkpoints — US commanders will ruthlessly use the appropriate lethal ordnance and bombs that will destroy the town and along with it all the insurgents in their bunkers who choose to be martyrs or consider the US warning to be merely a bluff. As for those insurgents who escaped with the egress of civilians from the town, the chances that they will be rearmed and recycled back to the insurgency will considerably diminish with the security of Baghdad and the borders of Syria and Iran from which the insurgency receives its arms and munitions.

Beyond any doubt, some civilians who stayed behind because they were either relatives or supporters of the insurgents, will be killed in this remorseless destruction, and there will be a tidal wave of protest, censure, and purgatorial blame against the US military action. But one must be reminded, that throughout history all protests and censures dissolve in the cup of victory. Providing this new strategy and tactics will be victorious against the Iraqi insurgency and its foreign jihadists - and the chances are that they will be - the exponents and the practitioners of this unconventional strategy will neither be accountable to man or God, but only to history. In all great crises of mankind, morality is superseded by Realpolitik and the reality of war.

5. The defeat of the insurgency also entails its covert allies, Syria and Iran, who are supplying the insurgents with armaments and whose porous borders are conduits for foreign jihadists to enter Iraq, are going to be dealt with. The US must exercise a strategy of “zero tolerance” against Syria and Iran. If they do not cease their “supply” of weapons to the insurgents and don’t stop foreign jihadists from entering Iraq, then US air power will attack their borders where the caches of weapons are stored.

CONCLUSION

The means of war were invented not for the purpose of lying idle in their “silos”, but to be used as a last resort against an implacable and mortal foe. If President Truman’s rationale for using the atomic bomb against Japan was the saving of American lives that an invasion of that country would inevitably entail, then President Bush has a stronger rationale of using the current lethal weapons -although not nuclear ones- that the US possesses against the bloodthirsty insurgency in Iraq. This is not only for the purpose of saving American lives but also of defeating an enemy who, in the event of taking over Iraq, would turn the latter - both physically and psychologically - into a haven and launching pad for global terror, whose jihadists would threaten the viability, and, indeed, the survival of Western civilization, as we know it.

In order to defeat global terror one must place terror in the hearts of the terrorists. Islamofanatics believe in toto that they have Allah on their side and while they even think they are winning will become an even more implacable foe. Fanatics only understand the language of force and respect only the currency of strength. It is this harsh fact which must drive the rules of engagement, replacing the hitherto “nice guy” military approach of the Americans, with some notable exceptions.

This new strategy of staying the course - but with the commanders on the ground having all the appropriate means of war at their disposal to be used remorselessly against the insurgents - has a great chance of being successful. And unlike all the pessimistic pundits who have “cashiered” victory in Iraq—but pessimists cannot win wars that is the vocation of optimists—2007 could be the Annus Mirabilis for President Bush, if he has the mettle and sagacity to adopt the above strategy that could indeed be the blueprint for victory.

PETER SINGER: THE ETHICIST'S ESCAPADE FROM THE REALITY
OF THE WAR IN IRAQ

Con George-Kotzabasis

The following paper is an extract from my book Unveiling The War Against Terror. The paper was written in early May, 2004

Peter Singer is acclaimed for being an outstanding philosopher and an ethicist of unique dimensions. In his interview with Tony Jones on the ABC's Lateline on April 21, he gave a remarkable performance, like a trapeze artist performing his dazzling acts "upside-down", that must have left many of his spectators, including this writer, breathless. In this performance, the legerdemainist, the juggler, supplanted the philosopher. The cloudless sky of the philosopher of transcendental ethics, all of a sudden, rained down the ethics of relativism. In the muddy swamp that resulted from this relativist downpour, the philosopher of absolute ethics vanished in the "quickmud", and the juggler of relativist ethics sprang like a lily from the swamp.

The utilitarian ethics of professor Singer, who believes that not all lives are of equal value and who is a strong advocate of euthanasia for others, but not for members of his own family, like a "halo" encircled the ethics of President Bush and his reasons for going to war in Iraq. In his recent book, 'The President of Good and Evil', he attempts to prove, by a rigmarole of legalism and ethical utilitarianism, that the war in Iraq was morally completely unjustified. In his view, the costs of t he war in terms of lives lost and property destroyed, by far outweighed the benefits that accrued to Iraq at the end of the war and its aftermath. As an illustration of this, he said in his interview with Tony Jones, that during the war and the U.S. occupation that followed, eight to ten thousand combatants and civilians had been killed and maimed, whereas during the year preceding the war, Saddam Hussein had not killed as many. Thus, Professor Singer the “legalist” in this outburst of relativist ethics, which is no more than the 'marginalization of the ethical', to quote Iris Murdoch, does not make any distinction between premeditated and unpremeditated killing. The deliberate killing of Iraqi civilians by Saddam is not legally and morally more culpable, than the accidental killing of civilians by the Coalition, in conditions of war. (Of course, he could argue that the war itself was criminal and therefore the killings that resulted from it were deliberate. But nowhere in his book does he claim that its leaders should be prosecuted as war criminals and hence he does not make use of such an argument). As long as the numbers of those killed accidentally are greater than those killed deliberately, the guilt falls on those who killed the greater number.

It is by such intellectual acrobatics, that professor Singer pushes the philosopher of ethics to his death and writes in memento mori of the latter on his epitaph, the "quantification" of ethics. Our utilitarian ethicist, while accepting and applying the Benthamite logic of the happiness of the greatest number, which refers not only to the material but also to the quality of man's life, nevertheless does not make any distinction between good and evil, except in the case of George Bush. In the hands of his mind, his master's 'general happiness of the greatest number', is transformed, in this case of the Iraq war, into the general guilt of the greatest number. Furthermore, he installs an "iron frame'' to the utilitarian consequences of the war in Iraq, as if the total results arising from the latter would materialise within such a short time-frame of one year. What would our utilitarian philosopher say, if the consequences of the war turn out to be more benign in few years time than his malign deductions of one year through the war? What would he have to say, if the war became pivotal to the defeat of global terror and of rogue states, such as the Libya capitulation foreshadowed, or if Iraq as a result of it would become a fledgling democracy with the potential of changing the geopolitical configuration and structure of the Middle East? Wouldn't these two goals, if they were achieved, contribute to the general happiness of the greatest number, and, thus too, to the individual happiness of our utilitarian ethicist? Only if our philosopher was also a modern Tiresias, indeed, a prophet of doom, who would foreordain the impossibility of achieving these two goals, could he sustain his present unsustainable position on the Iraq war.

After the brutal attack of September 11 and the imminent apocalyptic dark cloud of threats that hovered over America and the infidels of the West by Muslim fanaticism, what would be the 'rational duty'--which according to Immanuel Kant, joins the phenomenal world with the noumenal--of the government of a nation whose soil was directly attacked by an external and invisible enemy, what form, in concrete terms, would this duty take in the face of such a mortal foe? Appeal to International laws as are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, and the search for a solution through a diplomatic demarche, that would involve a discordant group of nations with different economic, political and strategic interests, as professor Singer suggests? And what other options would such a nation have in the event that the UN, as the keeper and ultimate arbitrator of these International rules, lacked the will and fortitude to enforce them upon recalcitrant rogue states which flagrantly and blatantly violate these rules time and again? When the failure of diplomacy was so conspicuously clear, especially during the Clinton administration, under whose eyes the dragon's teeth of terrorism were sown, as a result of the Mogadishu syndrome and the weakness of the former president not to prevent the take-off of terrorism and its state sponsors by using decisive force against them? William Shawcross, in his book, 'Allies', eloquently and with unassailable logic demonstrates this failure of the UN and its major members, France, Germany,and Russia, to confront decisively the violation of the UN's resolutions by Saddam Hussein since 1991.

In the face of such unprecedented weakness by the UN and its Security Council, in proportion to the global dimensions of this terrorist threat, magnified by the more than probable conception of the nexus of terrorism with rogue states, such as the regime of Saddam, what should the United States have done as the sole superpower, or as the modern Leviathan, to adopt professor Singer's "adoption" of Thomas Hobbes? To take a moral stand and appeal to International laws against the immoral stand of outlaws, who lack the slightest inclination to abide by these laws? No law can be effective, unless people or nations are prepared to comply with it. And no law can be effective, unless it is backed by force. International law, the humane laws of a civilised world, can never replace 'the stern laws of necessity', to quote the great historian Edward Gibbon, especially when such a world faces a mortal foe.

The Bush administration, exercising its duties with historical responsibility, had no other option but to apply these stern laws of necessity with resolution and celerity, especially when, Western civilization was threatened by these fanatic barbarians with nuclear weapons. The art of statesmanship would not allow itself to indulge in the inutile and decadent luxury of involving itself in interminable diplomatic wrangles and deadlocks whilst this time bomb was ticking away. President Bush had to act with swiftness, decisiveness, and pre-emption against this apocalyptic snowballing threat.

Before such a threat the Bush administration had the unenviable task and historical burden to act beyond the saintly confines of professor Singer's morality and legalism and go to war against both the terrorists and the regime of Saddam Hussein, which had for years sponsored and supported terrorists and was the linchpin in this developing nexus of terrorism and rogue states. And only the American Leviathan, among all other nations, can prevent this lethal conception from occurring, and at the same time defeat terrorism on a global scale. To Professor Singer's amusing argument, that the U.S. cannot play the role of a modern Leviathan because it has not been democratically elected to this position, one can only tritely respond that the "elect" are never elected to their positions. As an example of the latter, is Professor Singer himself. Presently, he occupies the chair in Bioethics at Princeton University, not by reason of a democratic mandate, since he has not been elected to this position, but by the force of the power of his own intellect. Likewise, America holds the position of a "Leviathan", not by reason of the democratic consensus of nations, but as a result of the reality of power, as an outcome of its incontestable global dominance in economic, political, military, and knowledge power. One can only be nonplussed that professor Singer is not aware of this simple fact and becomes a fugitive from this reality. Moreover, professor Singer traduces his own firm beliefs and commits the intellectual "sin" of the fallacy of "decomposition". If he really believes that not all lives are equal, one would expect him also to believe that not all brains are equal either. As it is by the inequality of his own mind that he holds his eminent place in the academic world. From this reality, it would not have been difficult for anyone to come to the same conclusion, that economic, political, military, and knowledge power, is also unequal among nations. Therefore, the mantle of Leviathan falls on the shoulders of certain nations which posses this supreme power, by the mandate of the reality of power.

But despite the insuperable power that America possesses it can still lose the war in Iraq if it loses its mettle and resolve to fight the insurgents with all its military might. The war against global terror and its state sponsors is an existential war, a war of survival, which cannot be fought on humane grounds. In such a setting, the torture of prisoners is the tragic price (war brutalises even the good guys under its immense pressures and can break the strongest of wills, the best of disciplines) that statesmanship must pay. As well as a tragic boon to political shysters, such as Mark Latham, to sensationalist populist journalists, such as Kerry O'Brien and Fran Kelly, not to mention others, of the ABC, and to the weakling critics of the war in Iraq, all of whom are provided with a further flawed reason to raise the white flag before the "triumphant" terrorist myrmidons.

The Pentagon's strategic planners must not be squeamish in using the appropriate decisive force against the insurgents in Iraq, i.e., by using the U.S.'s deadly arsenal against them that would result in their total surrender or annihilation. For this purpose, their military forces should set up a blockade of the towns of Fallujah, Kufa, and Karbala, where the Sunni and Shiite rebels are concentrated and after evacuating as many of the civilians as is possible from these towns, their commanders on the ground should declare an ultimatum to the insurgents, that unless they surrender within a specific time-frame, they will be totally annihilated by an "unthinkable" air and ground bombardment. The choice should be put starkly to the Mahdi army of Moqtada al Sadr, and to the insurgents in Fallujah. Once they either surrender or are killed en masse this will have a deadly psychological impact upon all other insurgents in Iraq, who in fear of their own lives, would more likely than not disarm and surrender. Alas, it is by such relentless exercise of its military power, that the American-led Coalition can subdue and quell the insurgency, and hence, win the war.

Of course, the liberal and leftist critics of the war can still be right in their belief about its wrongfulness as well as it being un-winnable, if President Bush proves to be all 'hat and no cattle', to use a Texan idiom - that is, that he is all rhetoric and no substance by being unwilling to pay the price of statesmanship and refusing to use lethal force against the insurgents, who, at this moment, are the avant garde of global terror. But tragically, they will be right at their own terminal cost. As they will all be morphed into modern Neros, and a la Professor Singer, they will "sing" the lyrics, and play the tune of their morality on their fiddles in a concert of their own death, while Western civilisation lies burning in the hellfire of the terrorist fanatics as “decreed by their Allah.” And history will have the ultimate revenge upon them. The banner of its morality will still be there, but there will be no one there to hold it.

NOTHING COMES FROM THE "REALIST" CRITIQUE OF PRESIDENT BUSH



A brief reply to Steven Clemons Washington Note
Con George-Kotzabasis

"Enlightened" realists, like Clemons and many others, do not realize that America being the sole superpower is in the unenviable position of being damned if she does and damned if she doesn't. But in a world that is ominously threatened by global terror and Islamofascist states such as Iran aiming to acquire nuclear weapons, it's better to be damned for doing things--even if one commits mistakes as a result of the huge scale of one's involvement and the uncertainties of war--than for doing nothing. Of course, if one does nothing ("nothing comes out of nothing", King Lear) one will be totally exempt from committing any mistakes.

Hence in the setting of the war against global terror and its state sponsors, the critique of the so called realists is completely misplaced and unproductive. It would have been more productive if they had corrected the errors of the Bush administration in the context of the war against global terror, instead of "decontextualizing" the war by an withdrawal of US forces from Iraq because of these errors. An withdrawal from Iraq before its security was accomplished would leave a political and military vacuum in the country that would be exploited by the Jihadists as a tremendous victory over the US, and would deal a deadly blow to the strategy of the latter against global terror. Furthermore, it would hurl the region into a maelstrom that would threaten the lives of millions of people as the present regimes would fight to the death to hold their power. All this will be achieved with the compliments of the shallow critics of the war and the political dilettantes of Congress, such as Nancy Pelosi, who want to put conditions upon the military and on general Petraeus how to fight the war.

LEADERS MADE UP ON THE ROLL OF THE DICE.

Con George-Kotzabasis

The following is an extract from my book Unveiling The War Against Terror, published in May 9, 2004. The article was written on September 24, 2003


There was always a lurking suspicion, that Gareth Evans' projection on the firmament of Australian politics as Foreign Minister, was not propelled by the force of egregious merit, but by the force of the "roll of the dice", as played in the numbers game of the "witless men" of the Labor Party. This suspicion was confirmed by the former Minister himself, by his intellectually tasteless and insipid, not to say brutal and banal, Hawke Lecture, mocking and deriding American Foreign Policy in the bombastiloquent, colorful, and jesting terms of a court jester. Obviously, your Chairman was more concerned with entertaining and beguiling his audience than enlightening it, although one must admit, that enlightenment cannot burst forth from an 'eclipsed star'.

His “hors d' oeuvres”, to quote him, was the most eclectically bitter anti-Americanism one could taste. It was either the reaction of a prima donna who had been shunned, or of a political guru whose advice and pearls of wisdom were not allowed to trespass the corridors of power. After a litany of syndromes of medical and clinical psychology, which are so alluring and beloved by the progressive intelligentsia, after an array of run-of-the-mill accusations against the Bush Administration, such as "current enemies used to be friends" etc., which seem to reveal more the caliber of his diplomatic and political acumen, than the fault lines of the Administration's foreign policy, and after his crude and brutish metaphors, such as "the top dog on the global block" (one can only ask about such a literary creation, was it an outcome of a syndrome of deprived imagination?), oblivious of the fact or shuffling it away, that it was this "dog" who saved the world from the twin miasma of Nazism and Communism, and that it will be the same dog who has the means and will to defeat global terrorism. At the end of this drivel, although he concedes that all these accusations might be "unfair", he nonetheless does not abstain from the ignominious temptation to make a 'big fair' out of them.

The English essayist Chesterton observed, "where is the best place to hide a leaf? In a tree.” Mr. Evans, apparently observes, where is the best place to hide a truth? Paint it in the colors of failure. The truth about global terrorism is that you cannot defeat it without also fighting the rogue states that directly and indirectly support it. It is therefore preeminently a two front war. And Iraq was a quintessential part of this strategy. Furthermore, only one nation in the world has the technological and military power, and will, to defeat global terrorism. The free nations of the world depend on America's triumph in this deadly contest with the terrorists. And as in all critical contests, there have to be tradeoffs between independence and dependence. Your Chairman would have known this, since he reads Isaiah Berlin.

This is the truth that the liberal intelligentsia is so abhorrent of and runs away from. All the accusations against the Howard Government's erosion of Australia's independence are, therefore, grossly erroneous and lack historical insight. As for his criticism of pre-emption, your Chairman completely disregards the fine distinction between pre-emption as an option, which is applicable to a world that is under discontinuous threats, and pre-emption as a doctrine, which is applicable to a world that is under continuous threats, as presently posed by the terrorists. And as for his hypocritical statement of standing with America, "but when we were needed on the big issues, we were always there", one is tempted to ask, is global terrorism not a big issue? Lastly, all his expatiations about international rules and laws that bring order in an anarchic world are totally inutile. Only when peoples and nations abide by these rules and laws, can the latter be effective. The trouble is that neither the terrorists nor the rogue states are prepared to submit to such a legalistic regime. Recent examples of this are Rwanda, Serbia, Kosovo, and Iraq.

All the colorful bubbles that your Chairman (Gareth Evans is the head of the International Crisis Group based in Brussels) presented in the guise of serious arguments in his lecture, will not survive the Aeolian winds that erupted on September 11. Your Chairman, for his own reasons, is a fugitive from reality. History has shown, that in hard times only the “hard men” can prevail. The wets and the wimps are cast aside. Alas, one can only summon the squatter diplomat, Gareth Evans, to "remove his belongings" from the domain of Talleyrand.