REALIST FOREIGN POLICY: US ISOLATIONISM CURE AGAINST TERROR
George Kotzabasis
Chuck Pena, a realist in foreign policy argues, in his piece in the Washington Note, June 16, 06, as a result of the “debacle” of the US invasion of Iraq, ‘that US interventionism is a root cause of anti-American resentment in the Muslim world-which breeds hatred and becomes a stepping stone to violence, including terrorism.’ He suggests, therefore, that the US ‘stop meddling in the internal affairs of countries…except when they directly threaten US national security interests’, lessen its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and cease supporting authoritarian regimes, such as the Saudi Arabian and that of Egypt. He strongly believes, that such a new course in America’s foreign policy can ‘cure the disease’ of terror. Hence, the withdrawal of the US from the hotspots of the world, such as the Middle East, is the prudent course to take and avoid, according to him, the disastrous intervention in Iraq from happening again.
This is no less than a new version of the US isolationism of the past. And this is isolationism with a vengeance. As such a policy will be taken by the only superpower in the world. And historically will be unprecedented. As no great, powerful nation in the past withdrew from the turbulent spots in the world, for the purpose of avoiding the resentment of those nations that were the fomenters of this turbulence, especially when the latter threatened the order upon which its power rested. Such a policy is completely unrealistic, especially when it’s recommended to be adopted by the sole superpower, which is the major force that keeps the world’s order, and deals a severe blow to the realist credentials of Chuck Pena.
But it’s obvious that pessimism is the paternity of this new version of isolationism. In the face of US casualties and reverses in Iraq, in the aftermath of its victory against the Saddam regime, some foreign policy realists have lost their grip on history as well as their strength to stand firm against these reverses. In all human enterprises mistakes and reverses are part of the process, and this is especially so in war. To believe that one can engage in warfare without committing errors and without the risk of suffering reverses is the belief of armchair strategists who presumably can plan their wars with the precision of Laplace’s demon leaving nothing to chance. Alas, such absolute knowledge that can foresee every reaction of an enemy to one’s action and hence plan victory against an enemy with algorithmic precision, has not been bequeathed by providence to man. But despite this weakness of man, some people have been endowed by nature to be strong in the face of all errors and reverses and to have the ability to turn them around. This is the endowment of great commanders, and this is the difficult task they have in the Iraqi war today. To cut and run, as a result of these tactical reverses that the Americans are going through, would be the greatest error that would surpass all other errors, as well as being a stupendous strategic reversal, of the US war against global terror.
Wars cannot be waged nor can they be won with pessimists a la Chuck Pena. It’s the vocation of optimists to win wars. And there are auspicious signs--beyond the dramatic selectivity of most of the media to pick the most gruesome events in Iraq, i.e., the daily terrorist killings of civilians and the frequent killings of US troops which are the two aspects of the war that have maximum impact upon the public--that with the formation of a government of national unity, the strengthening of its security forces, the amnesty announced by Prime Minister al Maliki, and the elimination of the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi, that the insurgents will become not only more isolated from, but also more hated than feared by, the Iraqi people. This will lead to the demoralization of the insurgents and the loss of their élan to continue fighting.
Moreover, and this is the most important feature of the insurgency, the fact that the main target of the insurgents are not their counter-combatants but civilians, exposes their military weakness, their increasing inability to kill, the by now, better trained Iraqi security forces, in armed combat. And the narrowing of the sieve, through which car bombs can penetrate into populated areas, will further disable the insurgents to continue to commit their atrocious attacks against civilians.
In the chronicle of insurgencies, no insurgency that was unable to fight its enemy in battle and resorted only in targeting and killing civilians was successful in destabilizing and eventually overthrowing the established regime. This fighting inability of the Iraqi insurgency is accentuated further, by having to confront the prowess of the occupying forces. And although it can inflict more than moderate casualties upon the occupying power and upon Iraqi security forces by the stealthily moving car bombs and laying road bombs, it cannot win the war by stealth. Furthermore, its increasing isolation from the people will deprive it of any logistical support that is getting from the latter, as well as the cover behind which it can hide. Hence, the insurgents will become cherry picking targets of the American-led forces.
In such militarily disadvantageous milieu the insurgents cannot survive for long. It’s this optimistic scenario that is unfolding from ‘the fog of war’ in Iraq, that the pessimists, like Chuck Pena, are unable to see. The Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq, and more generally for the region, has a high probability of being successful. And its success will destroy all the unrealistic propositions of the pessimistic realists, that America, the sole superpower, should withdraw from the hotspots of the world and insert itself into a cocoon of neo-isolationism.
The article was written on June 29, 2006
George Kotzabasis
Chuck Pena, a realist in foreign policy argues, in his piece in the Washington Note, June 16, 06, as a result of the “debacle” of the US invasion of Iraq, ‘that US interventionism is a root cause of anti-American resentment in the Muslim world-which breeds hatred and becomes a stepping stone to violence, including terrorism.’ He suggests, therefore, that the US ‘stop meddling in the internal affairs of countries…except when they directly threaten US national security interests’, lessen its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and cease supporting authoritarian regimes, such as the Saudi Arabian and that of Egypt. He strongly believes, that such a new course in America’s foreign policy can ‘cure the disease’ of terror. Hence, the withdrawal of the US from the hotspots of the world, such as the Middle East, is the prudent course to take and avoid, according to him, the disastrous intervention in Iraq from happening again.
This is no less than a new version of the US isolationism of the past. And this is isolationism with a vengeance. As such a policy will be taken by the only superpower in the world. And historically will be unprecedented. As no great, powerful nation in the past withdrew from the turbulent spots in the world, for the purpose of avoiding the resentment of those nations that were the fomenters of this turbulence, especially when the latter threatened the order upon which its power rested. Such a policy is completely unrealistic, especially when it’s recommended to be adopted by the sole superpower, which is the major force that keeps the world’s order, and deals a severe blow to the realist credentials of Chuck Pena.
But it’s obvious that pessimism is the paternity of this new version of isolationism. In the face of US casualties and reverses in Iraq, in the aftermath of its victory against the Saddam regime, some foreign policy realists have lost their grip on history as well as their strength to stand firm against these reverses. In all human enterprises mistakes and reverses are part of the process, and this is especially so in war. To believe that one can engage in warfare without committing errors and without the risk of suffering reverses is the belief of armchair strategists who presumably can plan their wars with the precision of Laplace’s demon leaving nothing to chance. Alas, such absolute knowledge that can foresee every reaction of an enemy to one’s action and hence plan victory against an enemy with algorithmic precision, has not been bequeathed by providence to man. But despite this weakness of man, some people have been endowed by nature to be strong in the face of all errors and reverses and to have the ability to turn them around. This is the endowment of great commanders, and this is the difficult task they have in the Iraqi war today. To cut and run, as a result of these tactical reverses that the Americans are going through, would be the greatest error that would surpass all other errors, as well as being a stupendous strategic reversal, of the US war against global terror.
Wars cannot be waged nor can they be won with pessimists a la Chuck Pena. It’s the vocation of optimists to win wars. And there are auspicious signs--beyond the dramatic selectivity of most of the media to pick the most gruesome events in Iraq, i.e., the daily terrorist killings of civilians and the frequent killings of US troops which are the two aspects of the war that have maximum impact upon the public--that with the formation of a government of national unity, the strengthening of its security forces, the amnesty announced by Prime Minister al Maliki, and the elimination of the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Zarqawi, that the insurgents will become not only more isolated from, but also more hated than feared by, the Iraqi people. This will lead to the demoralization of the insurgents and the loss of their élan to continue fighting.
Moreover, and this is the most important feature of the insurgency, the fact that the main target of the insurgents are not their counter-combatants but civilians, exposes their military weakness, their increasing inability to kill, the by now, better trained Iraqi security forces, in armed combat. And the narrowing of the sieve, through which car bombs can penetrate into populated areas, will further disable the insurgents to continue to commit their atrocious attacks against civilians.
In the chronicle of insurgencies, no insurgency that was unable to fight its enemy in battle and resorted only in targeting and killing civilians was successful in destabilizing and eventually overthrowing the established regime. This fighting inability of the Iraqi insurgency is accentuated further, by having to confront the prowess of the occupying forces. And although it can inflict more than moderate casualties upon the occupying power and upon Iraqi security forces by the stealthily moving car bombs and laying road bombs, it cannot win the war by stealth. Furthermore, its increasing isolation from the people will deprive it of any logistical support that is getting from the latter, as well as the cover behind which it can hide. Hence, the insurgents will become cherry picking targets of the American-led forces.
In such militarily disadvantageous milieu the insurgents cannot survive for long. It’s this optimistic scenario that is unfolding from ‘the fog of war’ in Iraq, that the pessimists, like Chuck Pena, are unable to see. The Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq, and more generally for the region, has a high probability of being successful. And its success will destroy all the unrealistic propositions of the pessimistic realists, that America, the sole superpower, should withdraw from the hotspots of the world and insert itself into a cocoon of neo-isolationism.
The article was written on June 29, 2006
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