THE IAEA IRAN REPORT Steven Clemons
Washington Note August 30, 2007
A brief reply by Con George-Kotzabasis
Once again Clemons in his urge to display his immaculate credentials for highfalutin diplomacy contra the crudity of war displaces the real issue of Iran that if the latter, beyond its dissimulation as an art form to dupe its European confreres and others, is not prepared to abide by the demands of the international community to suspend its nuclear program, America will have no other option but to attack it militarily.
Clemons by using the report of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Director General Mohamed AlBaradei as a credible report-whose stand on this issue has been discredited so many times in the past, and who presently has fallen victim to the dissimulations of the Iran regime that it’s willing to cooperate with the IAEA-that could prevent a force de frappe by the U.S. against Iran, shows that Clemons himself has been befuddled by the same dissimulations.
Thursday, August 30, 2007
Friday, August 24, 2007
HELMAN ON RICE THE NEW TRUMAN DOCTRINE
By Ambassador Gerald Helman
Informed Comment (Blog) –December 14, 2005
A reply: By Con George-Kotzabasis
Ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action Thucydides
Ambassador Helman must be reminded that even mountains can be moved by action. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush/Rice international order is a framework for the creation of a new order made in the image of a series of novel actions both in the world of diplomacy and in the field of war. These actions cannot be compared to any actions of the past nor can they be guided by successful actions of the past. Both the unique nature of the present enemy and the revolutionary changes in technology, especially in telecommunications and the advent of the Internet, as well the fundamental shift in geopolitical power, i.e., that the US is the sole hyperpower, demand a pivotal re-evaluation and transformation in the domains of diplomacy and military strategy.
The Bush administration had the historic burden of making this re-evaluation and transformation in circumstances where the four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were already galloping with scimitars drawn against America and the infidels of the West. In such circumstances political action, on the part of the US, was the child of necessity born of the coupling of reliable and credible intelligence about the prowess of the terrorist threat and its ability soon to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons supplied by rogue states.
Once the genies of fanatic millenarian terrorism were out of the bottle, the Bush administration did not have the leisurely time to sift through a sieve of deliberation all the evidence it had in hand - and some of it was in conflict both about its source and its credibility - but had to make a swift decision how to confront this enemy on the basis of reliable evidence and of the indisputable fact that Saddam possessed WMD in the past and had used them against his enemies. As well as having links with many terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. Within the context of a boundless threat posed by the terrorists, the argument of the critics of the Administration that there was no evidence linking Saddam to 9/11, and therefore his regime should not have been attacked, is puerile and bereft of strategic nous. Saddam’s link or not with 9/11 was already irrelevant. It was the likelihood of a future 9/11 link that was strategically relevant for imaginative, astute, and resolute policymakers.
Helman argues, that the war against terror “will require strong continuing international cooperation”. But he cannot perceive, that unlike the past when there were only two superpowers in a deathlock and America could get the solid support of all the countries of the West since it was providing the shield that protected them from the threat of the Soviet Union, now that America is the sole hyperpower it would have had great difficulties in receiving this strong cooperation from all the countries of the West. What will America then have to do now that it does not have in its grasp this elusive international cooperation from all the major countries of the world? Helman does not even pose this question least of all answer it.
Finally, he comments on the great importance and influence that NGOs exercised in the aftermath of the Second World War in the economic and political restructuring of the destroyed countries as a guide to the present problems, especially in the Middle East and in Iraq. Though NGOs can still be important in some cases, they are being to a great extent been supplanted by TV and the Internet. The people living under authoritarian and oppressive regimes by having regular access to the above outlets are daily “spoonfed” with information on how other people who reside in democratic countries prosper and live in freedom. That is why it is more than possible that democracy can be advanced by other states. And coming to my opening, it is by decisive and successful action that the Bush administration can move the “mountain” of international cooperation toward itself. There are auspicious signs that the Bush/Rice international order will as yet succeed in this historic task in Iraq.
By Ambassador Gerald Helman
Informed Comment (Blog) –December 14, 2005
A reply: By Con George-Kotzabasis
Ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action Thucydides
Ambassador Helman must be reminded that even mountains can be moved by action. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush/Rice international order is a framework for the creation of a new order made in the image of a series of novel actions both in the world of diplomacy and in the field of war. These actions cannot be compared to any actions of the past nor can they be guided by successful actions of the past. Both the unique nature of the present enemy and the revolutionary changes in technology, especially in telecommunications and the advent of the Internet, as well the fundamental shift in geopolitical power, i.e., that the US is the sole hyperpower, demand a pivotal re-evaluation and transformation in the domains of diplomacy and military strategy.
The Bush administration had the historic burden of making this re-evaluation and transformation in circumstances where the four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were already galloping with scimitars drawn against America and the infidels of the West. In such circumstances political action, on the part of the US, was the child of necessity born of the coupling of reliable and credible intelligence about the prowess of the terrorist threat and its ability soon to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons supplied by rogue states.
Once the genies of fanatic millenarian terrorism were out of the bottle, the Bush administration did not have the leisurely time to sift through a sieve of deliberation all the evidence it had in hand - and some of it was in conflict both about its source and its credibility - but had to make a swift decision how to confront this enemy on the basis of reliable evidence and of the indisputable fact that Saddam possessed WMD in the past and had used them against his enemies. As well as having links with many terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. Within the context of a boundless threat posed by the terrorists, the argument of the critics of the Administration that there was no evidence linking Saddam to 9/11, and therefore his regime should not have been attacked, is puerile and bereft of strategic nous. Saddam’s link or not with 9/11 was already irrelevant. It was the likelihood of a future 9/11 link that was strategically relevant for imaginative, astute, and resolute policymakers.
Helman argues, that the war against terror “will require strong continuing international cooperation”. But he cannot perceive, that unlike the past when there were only two superpowers in a deathlock and America could get the solid support of all the countries of the West since it was providing the shield that protected them from the threat of the Soviet Union, now that America is the sole hyperpower it would have had great difficulties in receiving this strong cooperation from all the countries of the West. What will America then have to do now that it does not have in its grasp this elusive international cooperation from all the major countries of the world? Helman does not even pose this question least of all answer it.
Finally, he comments on the great importance and influence that NGOs exercised in the aftermath of the Second World War in the economic and political restructuring of the destroyed countries as a guide to the present problems, especially in the Middle East and in Iraq. Though NGOs can still be important in some cases, they are being to a great extent been supplanted by TV and the Internet. The people living under authoritarian and oppressive regimes by having regular access to the above outlets are daily “spoonfed” with information on how other people who reside in democratic countries prosper and live in freedom. That is why it is more than possible that democracy can be advanced by other states. And coming to my opening, it is by decisive and successful action that the Bush administration can move the “mountain” of international cooperation toward itself. There are auspicious signs that the Bush/Rice international order will as yet succeed in this historic task in Iraq.
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
POVERTY OF WESTERN STRATEGIES IN THE AGE OF GODLY INSPIRED TERROR
by Con George-Kotzabasis
In the beginning was the deed... ‘war’. As strife is the fate and glory of mankind, to paraphrase the illustrious philosopher Heraclitus
The following text is a slightly modified reply to Colonel Dr. David Kilcullen, the Australian advisor to General David Petraeus commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, on his paper New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict, published on June 23, 2007 in Small Wars Journal blog.
In the sad “roll call” of the heavy casualties that your brave soldiers are sustaining as a result of the initial mistakes of the occupation, your paper is most encouraging and sanguine with its fecund and rich crop of ideas and its attempt to “split the atom” of the conduct of war in the age of godly inspired global borderless anarchic terror. As you correctly point out, all the paradigms of past wars, in an era when one is fighting a shadowy not easily identified enemy clad in civilian clothes and not less frequently in women’s, with a deadly belt around their bi-gender midriffs, and whose mode of warfare is not to fight its foes openly and directly but stealthily, are completely obsolete. This is why the “ancien regime” of war paradigms must be overthrown, since the line of their success has reached the end of its tether.
The new regime of paradigms must have as constituent parts the art of diplomacy, political virtuosity, and military might. But its parts will not have equal value. The enemy we are engaged with is not a rational enemy, but an irrational one of whose fighting fervor and suicidal attacks emanate from his perceived special relationship with his God. Hence, he is not prone to listen to the calls of “earthly” reason, since he only listens to the calls of an “afterlife”. He cannot be pacified by diplomatic and political concessions or by economic rewards, and he will accept the latter only as a respite that will enable him to build his forces for future attacks. Nor will he be “contained” in his aggressive actions by the threat of overwhelming military force, and indeed, not even by nuclear deterrence, as a rational actor would.
In such a conflict, diplomacy and politics will play an auxiliary part to the primary and vital part of the military. And in this “unholy” trinity, it will be the military that will be calling the shots. If in past, more transcendental philosophical times, the goal was for philosopher-kings to rule, in our, more down to earth and dangerous times, it will be soldier-savants in the major part that will determine the strategies and the course of war. Political elites will have the important quest and duty of (a) bringing together a notable alliance of nations against the jihadists and the states that support them, (b) supplying their military the material and spiritual wherewithal to wage war, and in the case of America, the Commander-In-Chief by exercising his constitutional right wisely in his selection and appointment of the best commanders on the ground render to them the freedom and the discretion to use the appropriate methods and armaments, that will defeat the enemy, as it’s the vocation of soldiers to wage and win wars not the politicians, and (c) along with the media, will have the historical responsibility to unify their people behind the great and Herculean task of their armed forces.
The primary and pivotal role that the military will have in this conflict rises from the nature and characteristics of this, unarguably, long war. First, the latter is not only global but also borderless. Strategically, it’s the ultimate absurdity when the terrorists or insurgents can find safe haven by crossing the borders of the country where they are waging war, that the nations that are engaged in war with them should continue to respect the national sovereignty of nations that allow their enemies to enter and use their own territories as safety zones and conduits of military supplies. (The strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War and the Cambodian sanctuary must not be repeated.) Those who are fighting them must pursue them over the border and destroy them. If international armed outlaws can cross the borders of sovereign nations then the lawful nations who are trying to apprehend them and punish them, have every right to cross these borders too. And the commanders on the ground will decide when to do so on the spot and expeditiously without being obstructed by the dilatoriness of political and legal deliberations. The nations that ostensibly are against terror, must sign a covenant with those nations whose armed forces are engaged in war against it, that they will allow these forces to cross their borders whenever their commanders on the ground consider this to be necessary.
Secondly, because of the simplicity in launching their lethal attacks-it takes only a "girdle" to spread havoc-this is an anarchic terror with no central command to plan its attacks. Every ordinary humdrum fanatic can find few brothers in their desire to pursue the seventy-two virgins. The Islamist fanatics like bin Laden and Zawahiri are not leaders in control of their forces, but sorcerer’s apprentices who have released the genii of terror without being able to control its actions that politically and strategically would have maximum impact. This is illustrated by many examples, the latest ones are Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and the terrorist group in Palestine who hold the British correspondent and who refuse to obey the orders of Hamas. And, indeed, this anarchic element of terror could be its Achilles’ heel. As strategically commanders who lose control of their troops are bound in the end to lose the war.
Of course, as you correctly point out, their leaders will use even these random actions of the terrorists in their propaganda to influence people in the West. And it might be true that their propaganda is on the winning side, but this not due to their cleverness but to the fact of the openness and transparency of democratic societies of whose political, media, and public response is so predictable. This multi-celled terror whose cells are spread in many parts of the world, both in Muslim countries and in the Muslim diaspora that has flooded the West, can only be dealt effectively by military and special forces led by their commanders on the ground improvising the best tactical responses and techniques that will cower and destroy this cellular body of terror. It’s therefore the nature and the long duration of this war that makes the paramountsy of the military the sine qua non for the defeat of this global menace.
The Boomerang of Terror
Moreover, psychologically and strategically, it’s of the utmost necessity to transplant the fear of terror into the hearts of the terrorists themselves. As only this boomerang of terror can defeat terror. This can be accomplished, as I had suggested six years ago (This proposal was sent to the Whitehouse on November, 2001), by setting up a covert global operational plan that will enlist the best active and non-active soldiers from an international pool and deploy them as hit squads. This clandestine group of transnational condottieri will aim at the elimination of the jihadist leaders as well as the religious radical preachers, wherever they happen to reside in the East or in the West. In my opinion it’s a stupendous folly while your soldiers are fighting the insurgents and terrorists in the foreground of battle to allow your “rear” to be inundated by a proliferation of fanatic recruits that are sired in rabbit numbers in the background of the Mosques and the madrassas which continue to supply the ranks of the terrorists with new recruits in greater numbers than you can eliminate them. The unanswerable as yet question is whether the leaders of Western civilization will have the mettle and sagacity to use uncivilized methods and means to defeat this barbaric horde, whose eschatological goal is to put an end to civilized life. One must be “brutally unsentimental’ as to the use of the instruments of war, to quote Roy Jenkins from his magisterial biography of Winston Churchill, as the latter was in the use of poison gas in the First World War.
Finally, your concept of “anthropology”, that sheds like a beacon its light upon the turbulent sea of terror, searching not only for the causes of this turbulence but also for the social, civil, and political unrest and repercussions upon people who breath this terror day and night, and how the counterinsurgency should address them, is most interesting. And it’s cheering and heartening to see that your new tactics to clear and hold and isolate the insurgents from the civilian population show some positive signs in the al Anbar province. I would only couple it with its other half “anthropotheology”, since this martyr’s terror is mainly fuelled with the fire of Allah.
I also agree entirely with our confrere in this discussion, Hawkwood.
Well done, Dr. Kilcullen
Delenda est Carthago
by Con George-Kotzabasis
In the beginning was the deed... ‘war’. As strife is the fate and glory of mankind, to paraphrase the illustrious philosopher Heraclitus
The following text is a slightly modified reply to Colonel Dr. David Kilcullen, the Australian advisor to General David Petraeus commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, on his paper New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict, published on June 23, 2007 in Small Wars Journal blog.
In the sad “roll call” of the heavy casualties that your brave soldiers are sustaining as a result of the initial mistakes of the occupation, your paper is most encouraging and sanguine with its fecund and rich crop of ideas and its attempt to “split the atom” of the conduct of war in the age of godly inspired global borderless anarchic terror. As you correctly point out, all the paradigms of past wars, in an era when one is fighting a shadowy not easily identified enemy clad in civilian clothes and not less frequently in women’s, with a deadly belt around their bi-gender midriffs, and whose mode of warfare is not to fight its foes openly and directly but stealthily, are completely obsolete. This is why the “ancien regime” of war paradigms must be overthrown, since the line of their success has reached the end of its tether.
The new regime of paradigms must have as constituent parts the art of diplomacy, political virtuosity, and military might. But its parts will not have equal value. The enemy we are engaged with is not a rational enemy, but an irrational one of whose fighting fervor and suicidal attacks emanate from his perceived special relationship with his God. Hence, he is not prone to listen to the calls of “earthly” reason, since he only listens to the calls of an “afterlife”. He cannot be pacified by diplomatic and political concessions or by economic rewards, and he will accept the latter only as a respite that will enable him to build his forces for future attacks. Nor will he be “contained” in his aggressive actions by the threat of overwhelming military force, and indeed, not even by nuclear deterrence, as a rational actor would.
In such a conflict, diplomacy and politics will play an auxiliary part to the primary and vital part of the military. And in this “unholy” trinity, it will be the military that will be calling the shots. If in past, more transcendental philosophical times, the goal was for philosopher-kings to rule, in our, more down to earth and dangerous times, it will be soldier-savants in the major part that will determine the strategies and the course of war. Political elites will have the important quest and duty of (a) bringing together a notable alliance of nations against the jihadists and the states that support them, (b) supplying their military the material and spiritual wherewithal to wage war, and in the case of America, the Commander-In-Chief by exercising his constitutional right wisely in his selection and appointment of the best commanders on the ground render to them the freedom and the discretion to use the appropriate methods and armaments, that will defeat the enemy, as it’s the vocation of soldiers to wage and win wars not the politicians, and (c) along with the media, will have the historical responsibility to unify their people behind the great and Herculean task of their armed forces.
The primary and pivotal role that the military will have in this conflict rises from the nature and characteristics of this, unarguably, long war. First, the latter is not only global but also borderless. Strategically, it’s the ultimate absurdity when the terrorists or insurgents can find safe haven by crossing the borders of the country where they are waging war, that the nations that are engaged in war with them should continue to respect the national sovereignty of nations that allow their enemies to enter and use their own territories as safety zones and conduits of military supplies. (The strategic mistakes of the Vietnam War and the Cambodian sanctuary must not be repeated.) Those who are fighting them must pursue them over the border and destroy them. If international armed outlaws can cross the borders of sovereign nations then the lawful nations who are trying to apprehend them and punish them, have every right to cross these borders too. And the commanders on the ground will decide when to do so on the spot and expeditiously without being obstructed by the dilatoriness of political and legal deliberations. The nations that ostensibly are against terror, must sign a covenant with those nations whose armed forces are engaged in war against it, that they will allow these forces to cross their borders whenever their commanders on the ground consider this to be necessary.
Secondly, because of the simplicity in launching their lethal attacks-it takes only a "girdle" to spread havoc-this is an anarchic terror with no central command to plan its attacks. Every ordinary humdrum fanatic can find few brothers in their desire to pursue the seventy-two virgins. The Islamist fanatics like bin Laden and Zawahiri are not leaders in control of their forces, but sorcerer’s apprentices who have released the genii of terror without being able to control its actions that politically and strategically would have maximum impact. This is illustrated by many examples, the latest ones are Fatah al-Islam in Lebanon, and the terrorist group in Palestine who hold the British correspondent and who refuse to obey the orders of Hamas. And, indeed, this anarchic element of terror could be its Achilles’ heel. As strategically commanders who lose control of their troops are bound in the end to lose the war.
Of course, as you correctly point out, their leaders will use even these random actions of the terrorists in their propaganda to influence people in the West. And it might be true that their propaganda is on the winning side, but this not due to their cleverness but to the fact of the openness and transparency of democratic societies of whose political, media, and public response is so predictable. This multi-celled terror whose cells are spread in many parts of the world, both in Muslim countries and in the Muslim diaspora that has flooded the West, can only be dealt effectively by military and special forces led by their commanders on the ground improvising the best tactical responses and techniques that will cower and destroy this cellular body of terror. It’s therefore the nature and the long duration of this war that makes the paramountsy of the military the sine qua non for the defeat of this global menace.
The Boomerang of Terror
Moreover, psychologically and strategically, it’s of the utmost necessity to transplant the fear of terror into the hearts of the terrorists themselves. As only this boomerang of terror can defeat terror. This can be accomplished, as I had suggested six years ago (This proposal was sent to the Whitehouse on November, 2001), by setting up a covert global operational plan that will enlist the best active and non-active soldiers from an international pool and deploy them as hit squads. This clandestine group of transnational condottieri will aim at the elimination of the jihadist leaders as well as the religious radical preachers, wherever they happen to reside in the East or in the West. In my opinion it’s a stupendous folly while your soldiers are fighting the insurgents and terrorists in the foreground of battle to allow your “rear” to be inundated by a proliferation of fanatic recruits that are sired in rabbit numbers in the background of the Mosques and the madrassas which continue to supply the ranks of the terrorists with new recruits in greater numbers than you can eliminate them. The unanswerable as yet question is whether the leaders of Western civilization will have the mettle and sagacity to use uncivilized methods and means to defeat this barbaric horde, whose eschatological goal is to put an end to civilized life. One must be “brutally unsentimental’ as to the use of the instruments of war, to quote Roy Jenkins from his magisterial biography of Winston Churchill, as the latter was in the use of poison gas in the First World War.
Finally, your concept of “anthropology”, that sheds like a beacon its light upon the turbulent sea of terror, searching not only for the causes of this turbulence but also for the social, civil, and political unrest and repercussions upon people who breath this terror day and night, and how the counterinsurgency should address them, is most interesting. And it’s cheering and heartening to see that your new tactics to clear and hold and isolate the insurgents from the civilian population show some positive signs in the al Anbar province. I would only couple it with its other half “anthropotheology”, since this martyr’s terror is mainly fuelled with the fire of Allah.
I also agree entirely with our confrere in this discussion, Hawkwood.
Well done, Dr. Kilcullen
Delenda est Carthago
Tuesday, August 07, 2007
DISCUSSION ON THE MERITS OF WAR IN IRAQ
Con George-Kotzabasis
The following is a discussion with professor Steven Metz Chairman:Regional Strategy and Planning Strategic Studies Institute of U.S. Army War College, held on Small Wars Journal blog on June 8, 2007
Dr. Metz said,
I'm no Obama fan, but I'm uncomfortable with logic of this essay. Iraq--like all counterinsurgency--is not a two-way game which pits the United States against the insurgents. While I personally disagree with the set-a-time-definite-for-withdrawal crowd, I can understand their argument (even while I do not accept it): the Iraqi government is not fully motivated to do what it needs to do to resolve the conflict as long as the American presence remains what it is. Moreover, every conflict forces the participants to decide whether the costs of persisting outweigh the costs of disengagement.
Certainly an American withdrawal from Iraqi would be trumpeted by AQ as a victory, but the question is whether that is worse than the costs of persistence (in terms of blood, money, the erosion of the military, political prestige, etc.)Not sure if you wrote the essay or someone else did, but I also take great issue with the contention that Petraeus can or should defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Primary responsibility lies with the Iraqis; secondarily with the U.S. embassy. Petraeus, in military jargon, is the "supporting" participant, not the "supported."
Kotzabasis said,
Dr. Metz, I would agree with you entirely that one has to count the costs of withdrawal with the costs of persistence if the Iraq war was an isolated one disengaged from the war against global terror. The fact however is that the war in Iraq now-whether it was so or not in the past is no longer the question-is an essential part of global terror. We see this not only in the pull that it has on the true believers of Islam from all over the world who fervently enter the ranks of the insurgency, but also in the imitation of the techniques of the latter, since they appear to be so successful against the coalition forces, by other jihadists, who are also waging war against the infidels in other parts of the world. Hence, America is involved in a long global war and not an isolated one, and must therefore count its costs on a mega-scale as they issue from its long term strategic interests, prestige, and indeed, its existence as the sole superpower that is the sine qua non of the stability of the world in these most dangerous times.
Taking a cue from John Fishel, the coalition forces are engaged in continuous major military operations against the insurgents with the goal to create the necessary security that is vital for the stabilization of the Iraqi government which is the linchpin of its ability to govern the country without American props. It seems to me therefore following this logic, that your question whether GEN Petraeus is the "supporting" or " supported", can be answered that he is both. Supporting the Iraqi government to stand on its own feet and supported by the political establishment (Ambassador Crocker) to do exactly that.
Hence, it seems to me to be obvious, that the paramountcy of resolving the conflict in Iraq, lies with the military and not with diplomacy. Especially when this conflict is drenched so heavily with religious fervour that is not open to the rational discourse of diplomacy, as we have witnessed lately of Hamas.
To your question whether I wrote the original essay, the answer is yes.
Dr. Metz said,
Important points but to me the President's logic seems somewhat like the "domino theory" as applied to Vietnam. That turned out to not be true.In terms of Iraq, we're damned if we do, damned if we don't. Disengagement will bolster the morale of Islamic extremists and reinforce the point that they can defeat the U.S.; persisting will erode the morale of the American public and do damage to the U.S. military. Which is the lesser evil? I myself am not sure. I am worried, though, that Iraq becomes a pyrrhic victory--the costs of success there so weaken us that we have failures elsewhere. To take one illustration, I think a case can made that if American morale and prestige had not been so weakened by Vietnam, we would have been able to act more effectively in Iran in the last 1970s. I'm concerned by that by so devoting ourselves to Iraq, we allow other, perhaps bigger, problems to fester and grow worse.
While an argument can be made that the foreign fighters in Iraq are not amenable to any sort of political resolution and simply need to be killed, if their support network among Iraqi Sunni Arabs is taken apart, killing them becomes much easier. Plus, I don't think AQI can, on its own, attain anything like "strategic success" without its allies in the Iraqi Sunni Arab community.Personally, I'm just hard pressed to imagine a military outcome that totally prevents suicide bombers. You can't guard everything and everyone all the time (unless we want to reinstate the draft and deploy a few million forces).
Kotzabasis said,
It's certainly true that the U.S. is in the unenviable position of being damned if she does and damned if she does not. But I would still argue, in the face of the great and ominous dangers that the West is facing and America being the only power that can defeat global terror, it's better to be damned for doing something than for doing nothing. ("Nothing comes out of nothing" King Lear.) This despite all the errors that inevitably are committed in all wars as a result of human limitations. And before the daunting huge scale operations involved in war, it's nigh impossible to probe and foresee all the unknowns embedded in them.
Con George-Kotzabasis
The following is a discussion with professor Steven Metz Chairman:Regional Strategy and Planning Strategic Studies Institute of U.S. Army War College, held on Small Wars Journal blog on June 8, 2007
Dr. Metz said,
I'm no Obama fan, but I'm uncomfortable with logic of this essay. Iraq--like all counterinsurgency--is not a two-way game which pits the United States against the insurgents. While I personally disagree with the set-a-time-definite-for-withdrawal crowd, I can understand their argument (even while I do not accept it): the Iraqi government is not fully motivated to do what it needs to do to resolve the conflict as long as the American presence remains what it is. Moreover, every conflict forces the participants to decide whether the costs of persisting outweigh the costs of disengagement.
Certainly an American withdrawal from Iraqi would be trumpeted by AQ as a victory, but the question is whether that is worse than the costs of persistence (in terms of blood, money, the erosion of the military, political prestige, etc.)Not sure if you wrote the essay or someone else did, but I also take great issue with the contention that Petraeus can or should defeat the insurgency in Iraq. Primary responsibility lies with the Iraqis; secondarily with the U.S. embassy. Petraeus, in military jargon, is the "supporting" participant, not the "supported."
Kotzabasis said,
Dr. Metz, I would agree with you entirely that one has to count the costs of withdrawal with the costs of persistence if the Iraq war was an isolated one disengaged from the war against global terror. The fact however is that the war in Iraq now-whether it was so or not in the past is no longer the question-is an essential part of global terror. We see this not only in the pull that it has on the true believers of Islam from all over the world who fervently enter the ranks of the insurgency, but also in the imitation of the techniques of the latter, since they appear to be so successful against the coalition forces, by other jihadists, who are also waging war against the infidels in other parts of the world. Hence, America is involved in a long global war and not an isolated one, and must therefore count its costs on a mega-scale as they issue from its long term strategic interests, prestige, and indeed, its existence as the sole superpower that is the sine qua non of the stability of the world in these most dangerous times.
Taking a cue from John Fishel, the coalition forces are engaged in continuous major military operations against the insurgents with the goal to create the necessary security that is vital for the stabilization of the Iraqi government which is the linchpin of its ability to govern the country without American props. It seems to me therefore following this logic, that your question whether GEN Petraeus is the "supporting" or " supported", can be answered that he is both. Supporting the Iraqi government to stand on its own feet and supported by the political establishment (Ambassador Crocker) to do exactly that.
Hence, it seems to me to be obvious, that the paramountcy of resolving the conflict in Iraq, lies with the military and not with diplomacy. Especially when this conflict is drenched so heavily with religious fervour that is not open to the rational discourse of diplomacy, as we have witnessed lately of Hamas.
To your question whether I wrote the original essay, the answer is yes.
Dr. Metz said,
Important points but to me the President's logic seems somewhat like the "domino theory" as applied to Vietnam. That turned out to not be true.In terms of Iraq, we're damned if we do, damned if we don't. Disengagement will bolster the morale of Islamic extremists and reinforce the point that they can defeat the U.S.; persisting will erode the morale of the American public and do damage to the U.S. military. Which is the lesser evil? I myself am not sure. I am worried, though, that Iraq becomes a pyrrhic victory--the costs of success there so weaken us that we have failures elsewhere. To take one illustration, I think a case can made that if American morale and prestige had not been so weakened by Vietnam, we would have been able to act more effectively in Iran in the last 1970s. I'm concerned by that by so devoting ourselves to Iraq, we allow other, perhaps bigger, problems to fester and grow worse.
While an argument can be made that the foreign fighters in Iraq are not amenable to any sort of political resolution and simply need to be killed, if their support network among Iraqi Sunni Arabs is taken apart, killing them becomes much easier. Plus, I don't think AQI can, on its own, attain anything like "strategic success" without its allies in the Iraqi Sunni Arab community.Personally, I'm just hard pressed to imagine a military outcome that totally prevents suicide bombers. You can't guard everything and everyone all the time (unless we want to reinstate the draft and deploy a few million forces).
Kotzabasis said,
It's certainly true that the U.S. is in the unenviable position of being damned if she does and damned if she does not. But I would still argue, in the face of the great and ominous dangers that the West is facing and America being the only power that can defeat global terror, it's better to be damned for doing something than for doing nothing. ("Nothing comes out of nothing" King Lear.) This despite all the errors that inevitably are committed in all wars as a result of human limitations. And before the daunting huge scale operations involved in war, it's nigh impossible to probe and foresee all the unknowns embedded in them.
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