HELMAN ON RICE THE NEW TRUMAN DOCTRINE

By Ambassador Gerald Helman

Informed Comment (Blog) –December 14, 2005

A reply: By Con George-Kotzabasis


Ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action Thucydides


Ambassador Helman must be reminded that even mountains can be moved by action. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush/Rice international order is a framework for the creation of a new order made in the image of a series of novel actions both in the world of diplomacy and in the field of war. These actions cannot be compared to any actions of the past nor can they be guided by successful actions of the past. Both the unique nature of the present enemy and the revolutionary changes in technology, especially in telecommunications and the advent of the Internet, as well the fundamental shift in geopolitical power, i.e., that the US is the sole hyperpower, demand a pivotal re-evaluation and transformation in the domains of diplomacy and military strategy.

The Bush administration had the historic burden of making this re-evaluation and transformation in circumstances where the four Horsemen of the Apocalypse were already galloping with scimitars drawn against America and the infidels of the West. In such circumstances political action, on the part of the US, was the child of necessity born of the coupling of reliable and credible intelligence about the prowess of the terrorist threat and its ability soon to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons supplied by rogue states.

Once the genies of fanatic millenarian terrorism were out of the bottle, the Bush administration did not have the leisurely time to sift through a sieve of deliberation all the evidence it had in hand - and some of it was in conflict both about its source and its credibility - but had to make a swift decision how to confront this enemy on the basis of reliable evidence and of the indisputable fact that Saddam possessed WMD in the past and had used them against his enemies. As well as having links with many terrorist organizations, including al Qaeda. Within the context of a boundless threat posed by the terrorists, the argument of the critics of the Administration that there was no evidence linking Saddam to 9/11, and therefore his regime should not have been attacked, is puerile and bereft of strategic nous. Saddam’s link or not with 9/11 was already irrelevant. It was the likelihood of a future 9/11 link that was strategically relevant for imaginative, astute, and resolute policymakers.

Helman argues, that the war against terror “will require strong continuing international cooperation”. But he cannot perceive, that unlike the past when there were only two superpowers in a deathlock and America could get the solid support of all the countries of the West since it was providing the shield that protected them from the threat of the Soviet Union, now that America is the sole hyperpower it would have had great difficulties in receiving this strong cooperation from all the countries of the West. What will America then have to do now that it does not have in its grasp this elusive international cooperation from all the major countries of the world? Helman does not even pose this question least of all answer it.

Finally, he comments on the great importance and influence that NGOs exercised in the aftermath of the Second World War in the economic and political restructuring of the destroyed countries as a guide to the present problems, especially in the Middle East and in Iraq. Though NGOs can still be important in some cases, they are being to a great extent been supplanted by TV and the Internet. The people living under authoritarian and oppressive regimes by having regular access to the above outlets are daily “spoonfed” with information on how other people who reside in democratic countries prosper and live in freedom. That is why it is more than possible that democracy can be advanced by other states. And coming to my opening, it is by decisive and successful action that the Bush administration can move the “mountain” of international cooperation toward itself. There are auspicious signs that the Bush/Rice international order will as yet succeed in this historic task in Iraq.